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I.
LEGAL ARGUMENT
A. REECE HAS SET FORTH SUFFICIENT FACTS TO PROCEED ON HIS
BRADY CLAIM AND HE DID NOT HA VE THE OPPORTUNITY TO
OBTAIN FURTHER FACTS THROUGH DISCOVERY.

In the Respondent's Brief, Respondent argues that Reece "has failed to show that the
evidence was so damning that its absence undermines confidence in the outcome of the trial."

Respondent's Brief at 7. First, Respondent has failed to address whether the district court used
the appropriate standard in its analysis.

The district court stated, "Had the report or any

information regarding the lab's inadequate practices been available at the time of the trial, this

Court would not have likely allowed Reece to impeach Lewis because the information would
have confused the issues."

(CR 176) (emphasis added).

Again, this statement does not

adequately analyze the standard of whether Reece raised a genuine issue of material fact - the
standard used on a summary dismissal. Chouinard v. State, 127 Idaho 836, 838 (Idaho App.
1995).
Second, as to whether Reece was prejudiced by the State's concealment of Lamora
Lewis's misconduct, in addition to Reece's argument in his Appellant's Brief, Reece would
additionally point out that he had only limited information in proceeding on the matter. Reece
could not seek additional information on Lamora Lewis's misconduct outside of discovery,
which the district court denied. In fact, Idaho Code § 9-340C(l) bars the release of any of
personnel records of state employees and could not seek the same through public records
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requests. As such, Reece has proceeded and made his arguments only on the limited information
that he had to pursue his claim.
Reece simply has been denied the opportunity to argue and prove the full prejudice that
ensued from his inability to cross-examine Ms. Lewis at his trial. Reece has argued the prejudice
as he is able with the limited facts that he has - as set forth in his Appellant's Brief - and
continues to assert the prejudice as set forth therein.
B. REECE'S COUNSEL WAS INEFFECTIVE IN FAILING TO ARGUE A
SUPPRESSION ISSUE AS WAS SET FORTH IN MCNEELEY.
As is argued in his Appellant's Brief, Reece asserts that his trial counsel was ineffective
for failing to bring a motion to suppress his forced blood draw. Reece asserts that his counsel
should have made an argument like that made in Missouri v. McNeeley, 133 S. Ct. 1552 (2013).
The Respondent now argues that Reece's trial counsel was not ineffective because he held no
"general duty ... to anticipate changes in law."

Respondent's Brief at 15.

While Reece

recognizes that Idaho case law at the time held that blood draws were within an exigency
exception to a warrant requirement, the primary case cited on this matter was that of Schmerber
v. California, 384, U.S. 757 (1966). At the time of Reece's trial counsel's representation, the
ruling of Schmerber was not entirely clear, as Respondent argues. In fact, some states read
Schmerber to require other "special facts" to be present before exigent circumstances would be
found, and the language of Schmerber was left to interpretation. See, e.g., State v. Rodriguez,
156 P.3d 771 (Utah 2007) (" ... Schmerber does not stand for the proposition that the loss of
evidence of a person's blood-alcohol level through the dissipation of alcohol from the body was a
sufficient exigency to justify a warrantless blood draw. Rather, these three categories of 'special
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facts' combined to create the exigency. The evanescence of blood-alcohol was never special
enough to create an exigent circumstance by itself.") and State v. Johnson, 774 N.W.2d 340
(Iowa 2008) (The Supreme Court of Iowa agrees with the holding in State v. Rodriguez.)
The ruling in McNeeley was not a new, novel idea that substantially changed Fourth
Amendment law as it relates to forced blood draws. It was a reiteration of the rule set forth in
Schmerber.

In fact, in McNeeley, the United States Supreme Court continues to agree with

Schmerber that the approach must be a totality of the circumstances and cites the ruling in
Schmerber as continually applicable. McNeeley 133 S. Ct. at 1559-60 (2013). Reece has at least

raised a genuine issue of material fact as to whether his attorney should have raised a motion to
suppress based upon his forced blood draw, as McNeeley only clarified the rule of law that
Reece's attorney should have argued.
C. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN NOT ALLOWING REECE TO ANSWER TO
ITS NEW ANALYSIS AS SET FORTH IN THE COURT'S MEMORANDUM
DECISION PURSUANT TO IDAHO CODE § 19-4906(b).
As set forth in Appellant's Brief, the district court incorrectly provided additional
analysis as to why it was dismissing Reece's Brady claim without providing Reece the
opportunity to respond to the same pursuant to Idaho Code § l 9-4906(b ). In this matter, as to
Reece's Brady claim, Reece only had an opportunity to respond to the district court's analysis as
contained in the Notice of Intent to Dismiss, which focused on whether at trial the concealed
evidence would have "confused the issues." (CR 176). However, after Reece answered the
Court's Notice of Intent to Dismiss, the Court dismissed Reece's Brady claim because the
district court found that Reece had not established prejudice. (CR 207-10).
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In fact, Respondent's analysis on Reece's Brady claim further demonstrates that the
district court's analysis in the Court's Memorandum Decision re: Notice of Intent to Dismiss
(see CR 207-21 OJ was different than what was set forth in the district court's Notice of Intent to
Dismiss (see CR 176).

Respondent argues that Reece failed to show evidence that Lewis'

misconduct was admissible impeachment evidence. Respondent's Brief at 9. In discussing the
district court's analysis in relation to Lamora Lewis's testimony as admissible impeachment
evidence, Respondent states: "While the district court did not rely on this ground in ultimately
dismissing Reece's petition (r., p.207), it is a ground for which Reece had notice, and is thus a
potential alternative ground upon which this Court may affirm the district court's summary
dismissal of the claim." Id. (Emphasis added). Yet, the argument the Respondent now asserts as
its alternative theory in this appeal was the only basis for the district court's decision to dismiss
Reece's Brady claim. (CR 176). All of the district court's comments were directed to show why
the court "would not have likely allowed [Reece] to impeach Lewis ... " id.
Reece did not have the opportunity to respond to the district court's analysis upon which
the court summarily dismissed Reece's Brady claim as set forth in the Memorandum Decision
re: Notice of Intent to Dismiss (see CR 207-210). Thus, the court's dismissal was in violation of
Idaho Code§ l 9-4906(b).
II.
CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, Reece continues to respectfully requests that this Court
find that the district court's summary dismissal of Reece's claims as set forth herein be reversed.
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DATED this 10th day of March, 2014.
MCRAE LAW OFFICE, PLLC

By

~
Steven R. McRae
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant
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